I am representing ‘myself’ in a case about the so-called “policy-investments”.

It is said that a shoemaker walks without shoes and a lawyer goes to court on everyone’s business but his own. Quite recently I have made my debut in court as a plaintiff. In my ‘own’ case.

Some time ago – aware that the pension system does not offer much to the liberal professions – I concluded a contract with a certain entity for a so-called ‘policy-investment’. The name is a hybrid combining features of life insurance and an endowment fund. In short: in return for paying premiums, in the future I or my loved ones (designated as beneficiaries) can receive compensation in the event of a fortuitous event (illness, death), or have the premiums paid out, which are invested in parallel. I paid premiums and then stopped doing so, recognising that they were not being invested optimally – capital was accruing at a level not much higher than that possible with a bank deposit. After some time, I got a refund of exactly 5% of the invested capital, with the explanation that a regulatory termination fee had been deducted. The amount deducted from me was not very large, and I forgot about the matter for a couple of years, noting in my calendar, however, the limitation period. I recalled the case shortly before it expired, wanting to gain experience in ‘policy-investment’ cases that I could use in the interests of clients. After all, it is best to “experiment” on oneself.

This was the first time I had brought a claim as a party, rather than as its attorney. And as a consumer – which turned out to be quite important. I pointed out that the provision of the GTC (general terms and conditions) of the ‘policy-investment’, insofar as it provides for a “fee” for premature termination of the contract, completely unrelated to the costs of servicing the contract and, moreover, grossly excessive, as it “consumes” almost all of the capital accumulated by the investor, violates the principles of fair trading with the consumer and is therefore invalid. I added that it was apparent from the wording of another provision of the T&Cs that the insurer’s costs of servicing the contract were covered “on an ongoing basis” by deducting separate charges, in the order of a few percent of each benefit, from the individual payments. As a matter of prudence, I considered that the amount adequate to the opponent’s expenses directly related to the servicing of “my” contract for a period of approximately two years was an amount in the order of PLN 150-250 in addition to those previously charged. I did not claim reimbursement to this extent, limiting the claim.

In response, I was addressed with a letter of more than ten pages in which the opponent – presumably following the pattern used in all cases – disputed all possible allegations, including those which I had not formulated at all. It argued that I had had the opportunity to study the contents of the contract, that by signing it I had accepted its contents, that I had not been misled by the door-to-door salesman. When appearing before the court for questioning, I confirmed that I had read the contract before concluding it and that I understood its contents. I stressed that I was not a victim of fraud or that the dispute was the fault of the door-to-door salesman. It is just that the prohibition on abusive clauses (terms that regulate the rights and obligations of the consumer in a manner contrary to good morals) in consumer transactions is objective and absolute, regardless of whether the consumer has examined the contract before concluding it or not. Nor is the trader relieved of the negative consequences of relying on such clauses by showing that the consumer was not misled as to the content of the contract.

In the end, my debut as a plaintiff in the lawsuit went well. I was able to invest the funds returned to me following the upholding of the claim in a way that I believe was somewhat more sensible than the original. And the defendant… certainly lost one client.